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Proof Costs Money, and Money Wants Proof: The Founder’s Trap | Michael W., Pacylex Pharmaceuticals

Michael W. · Biotech executive, Pacylex Pharmaceuticals · 22:39
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What we talked about.

Sunny Ray talks with Michael W. of Pacylex Pharmaceuticals about the funding gap facing early stage biotech. Michael explains how venture capital has moved toward late stage assets with proven data, leaving founders who need ten to thirty million dollars to reach phase one and phase two stranded in a catch 22 where proof costs money and money wants proof. He traces his path from a high school fascination with genetics through the NIH National Cancer Institute and fifteen years at public companies including Nectar and Ligand, where he learned how drugs are developed and how heavily portfolio decisions turn on money. He describes why he now questions whether health care should be treated as a free market, and why he chooses to work on first in class medicines rather than the tenth version of a proven one. The conversation closes with the company's oral cancer drug, why it targets AML first alongside venetoclax, and the surprising phase one results seen across many cancer types. Sunny proposes a part two to continue the discussion.

Investors want proven medicines, but proving them costs millions. A veteran biotech founder explains the trap and what it means for patients.

The questions, and the answers.

Where does the tension between proof and money show up most sharply for founders?

It hits when companies move from a million or two of angel money to needing tens of millions to reach the clinic. Venture capital has migrated to late stage assets where safety and efficacy data already exist. When founders seek $10 million for phase one or $30 million for phase two data, investors balk, because they no longer want to fund gathering the evidence.

What did your years at Ligand and Nectar teach you that a startup never could?

Public companies gave me resources and colleagues, so I wasn't working without a net like you do in a startup. I spent 15 years learning how to develop drugs and devices, read markets, and set priorities, and I was a project manager at several companies. Mostly I learned what I didn't know, and it helps to have a map before you start traveling.

Which mistake did you only make once?

People management. I've often come in as CEO alongside technical founders whose expectations and prejudices about development differed from reality. I didn't realize how much education would be part of my role with founders, and I didn't expect them to come into alignment quickly enough. That disconnect was something I just didn't appreciate upfront.

Who or what shaped how you think about turning science into a company?

A big part was my eight and a half years at Nectar, where McKinsey helped us prioritize our portfolio and I saw how much it's about money. Over the past 20 years I've watched exciting products abandoned because the financials didn't line up. That has me questioning whether it should all be about money, and whether health care is truly a free market.

How do you explain your work to someone who fell asleep in high school biology?

I work on life science diamonds in the rough, things that are completely new, like the first cholesterol drug rather than the ten statins that followed. The first time is hardest because you carry the burden of proof. As investors migrate to lower risk, they abandon pioneers in favor of the tenth or hundredth GLP-1.

Why run two companies at the same time?

Neither can afford to pay me a salary for my experience. After 34 years, in industry I'd be a vice president or C-level officer earning perhaps $500,000 to a million plus options and bonuses. I work in startups for the passion of bringing something new, and for my ownership stake, which is how I'll be rewarded if we succeed.

Why AML first, out of every cancer you could have chosen?

I have to pick one cancer because each is a separate study and registration. AML has a five year survival rate of about 33.5 percent, so the need is highest. Our oral drug synergizes with venetoclax and blocks resistance to it. Fewer than 200 patients can support accelerated approval, and orphan status adds seven years of exclusivity.

What do early trials tell you that the lab never could?

Side effects in animals matched what we saw in people, which was very predictive. The surprise was efficacy in our all comers phase one. At the dose we're taking into phase two, 57 percent of patients had six months or more of stable disease, some up to 18 months, and some saw roughly 50 percent reductions in tumor markers.

Biotech fundingFounder's trapEarly stage venture capitalOncologyAMLDrug developmentHealth care economics

Michael W.

Biotech executive, Pacylex Pharmaceuticals

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